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Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc.'
The employment-at-will rule provides that in the absence of an employ-
ment contract or contrary statutory provision, a hiring for an unspecified
length of time is terminable by the employee or the employer at any time,
with or without cause. 2 The doctrine, developed at a time when less technical
specialization of employee skills permitted greater "job-hopping" between
more plentiful jobs, 3 has been roundly criticized in recent years for its failure
to meet the needs and expectations of the employee in today's job market.4
Understandably, modern business balks at the prospect of relinquishing its
power to regulate the work force through the hiring and firing process. As
a result, the discharge of at-will employees may be the most commonly
litigated issue in the rapidly changing field of labor law.
5
1. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
2. Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. 1981) (en banc),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981); 53 AM. JuR. 2D Master & Servant § 43 (1970).
3. See Note, Employment At Will: A Proposal to Adopt the Public Policy
Exception in Florida, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 614, 621-22 (1982).
4. The condition of the modern employee has been described as follows:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others
for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely
dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except
for the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such de-
pendence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is
something new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in
another man's hands.
F. TANNENBAuM, A Prmiosopry OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis in original).
For a sampling of the commentary criticizing the at-will rule, see Blades, Em-
ployment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Em-
ployer Power, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges from
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Comment,
Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Ex-
ception, 96 HARv. L. Ry. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Wrongful Discharge].
Opposition to the rule, however, is not unanimous. See generally Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. RIv. 947 (1984).
5. See Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment At Will Doctrine: Manage-
ment Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REv. 855, 856-58 (1983).
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Under English common law a hiring for an unspecified length of time
was presumed to have been intended to serve as an employment contract for
one year. 6 Most early American courts followed this rule until the late nine-
teenth century7 when the influence of the industrial revolution and laissez-
faire economic thought reached the field of contract law. 8 The employer's
legal responsibility to the employee gave way to prevailing notions of freedom
of enterprise.9 Accordingly, courts adopted the presumption that an em-
ployment contract of unspecified term was not for one year, but was ter-
minable without liability by either party at any time.' 0 The employment-at-
6. The common law presumption is said to have had its origin in the Statute
of Labourers which was enacted in the fourteenth century in response to the labor
shortage resulting from the Black Death. See Comment, The At-Will Doctrine: A
Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667
(1984); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-64 (4th ed. 1936). The
rule survived the repeal of the Statute, and the policy behind the rule is suggested in
Blackstone's later statement:
[I]f the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law con-
strues it to be for a year, upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant
shall serve and the master maintain him throughout all the revolutions of
the respective seasons, as well when there is work to be done as when there
is not.
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMM ENTARES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 425 (1783). See generally
Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891); Davis
v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882).
8. P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 681-87 (1979);
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 342-43 (1974)
[hereinafter Note, Job Security].
9. See Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice
Francis - A Judge for Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 480, 481 (1970).
10. See, e.g., Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156 (1879); Harper v. Hassard, 113
Mass. 187 (1873); Finger v. Koch & Schilling Brewing Co., 13 Mo. App. 310 (1883);
Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). The employ-
ment-at-will doctrine as articulated in H. G. Wood's treatise was widely accepted by
the American judiciary:
[W]ith us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is on him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day,
week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and
no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only for the rate
fixed for whatever time the party shall serve. It is competent for either party
to show what the mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to
the matter; but unless their understanding was mutual that the service was
to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring
and is terminable at the will of either party....
H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
There is general agreement among the commentators that the authorities cited by
Wood did not support his statement of the rule. See Feinman, supra note 6, at 125-
27; Note, Job Security, supra note 8, at 341-42.
[Vol. 52
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will doctrine reached its high-water mark when the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down state and federal statutes limiting employers' rights to discharge
unionized employees as unconstitutional." Despite recent attempts to limit
the scope of its application, 2 the rule remains well established. 3
The at-will rule does not apply to all American workers. Collective
bargaining agreements generally protect labor union members from discharge
absent "cause" or "just cause,' ' 4 and civil service rules" and some consti-
tutional provisions' 6 protect governmental employees from arbitrary dis-
missal.
Commentators have proposed legislative abrogation of the at-will rule 7
to soften the impact of the rule on the two-thirds of the work force which
is not protected by unionization or government employment.'" Thus far only
one state has taken this approach, 9 and no states have as yet adopted an
11. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state statute prohibiting employers
from making non-membership in labor unions a condition of employment violates
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908) (federal statute barring discharge for unionization violates fifth amendment
personal and property rights); see Comment, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 4, at
1933-34 (In Coppage, "the Constitution was held to protect an employer's freedom
to contract with its employees on whatever terms it wished."); see also Comment,
Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will - Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?,
35 VAND. L. REv. 201, 208-10 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Employer Rights]. Con-
tra NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Congress has power
to protect right to organize).
12. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
13. See Comment, Wrongful Discharge, supra note 4, at 1816 (two-thirds of
the American work force is governed by the employment-at-will rule).
14. See M. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIsPUTEs 230-38
(1974).
15. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 § 204(a), 5 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. II
1978).
16. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (state college teacher
possesses property right in continued employment by virtue of college's de facto
system of tenure and, thus, is entitled to fifth and fourteenth amendment procedural
due process upon discharge); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1974) (probationary teacher entitled to fifth and fourteenth amendment procedural
due process where discharge for alleged mental instability constituted deprivation of
liberty interest), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975). See generally Lowy, Constitutional
Limitations on the Dismissal of Public Employees, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 519-31 (1976) (proposing a statute based on a just
cause standard for firings with the adjudication of cases to be channelled into the
arbitration process).
18. See Peck, supra note 4, at 8-10. Professor Peck has estimated that between
6,000 and 7,500 employees at will lose their jobs each year under conditions which
would be considered unjust by an arbitration panel.
19. Montana law provides that a "servant is presumed to have been hired for
such length of time as the parties adopt for the estimation of wages. A hiring at a
yearly rate is presumed to be for 1 year; a hiring at a daily rate, for 1 day; a hiring
by piecework, for no specified term." MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-602 (1985).
1987]
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unjust dismissal statute. 20 Existing state" and federal2 legislation, however,
does provide a limited measure of employee protection.
Judicial challenges to the at-will rule have been based upon both contract
and tort theories. Employees' theories of recovery in contract have included
reliance on an express or implied-in-fact promise,23 an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, 24 and promissory estoppel. 25 Because of the
limitations on relief afforded in contract actions26 and potential obstacles to
establishing a contract cause of action, 27 employees have increasingly sought
recovery in tort.
20. One example of an unjust dismissal statute is that which has been adopted
by the United Kingdom which prohibits discharge absent some "substantial reason
of a kind such as to justify the dismissal." Summers, supra note 17, at 514 (quoting
the Industrial Relations Act 1971, § 24(2)(a), 41 Hal. Stat. 2062 (1971 Comp.)).
For a discussion of legislative efforts in the United States to limit the at-will
doctrine, see Heinsz, supra note 5, at 862-65.
21. See, e.g., MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (West 1981); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 213.055 (1986); N.Y. Exsc. LAW § 296(1)(a), (3) (McKinney 1982); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5207a (Vernon 1971); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon
Supp. 1984).
22. Judicial and Judiciary Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (Supp. 1982)
(prohibiting discharge of an employee because of service on a petit or grand jury);
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4) (1977) (prohibiting
discharge of an employee because of union activity); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1977 & Supp. 1982) (prohibiting discharge of an employee for
filing suit or testifying in an action brought under the minimum wage and overtime
laws); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1977 &
Supp. 1982) (prohibiting discharge of an employee because of age); Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1977) (prohibiting discharge of
an employee for demanding a safe workplace); Employee Retirement Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1977) (prohibiting discharge of an employee to prevent
vesting of her pension rights); Title IV, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1977) (prohibiting discharge of an employee because of race, religion, sex, color,
or national origin).
23. See, e.g., R.S. Mikesell Assocs. v. Grand River Dam Auth., 627 F.2d 211
(10th Cir. 1980); O'Neill v. ARA Services, 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Delzell
v. Pope, 200 Tenn. 641, 294 S.W.2d 690 (1956).
24. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1977). Professor Joan Krauskopf considers likely the recognition of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Missouri courts. Krauskopf,
Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC
L. REV. 189, 212 n.166 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d
307 (1981); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
26. Suits brought under a contract cause of action may limit recovery to lost
wages. See, e.g., Alpern v. Hurwitz, 644 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1981); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974). In addition to lost
wages, plaintiffs in tort actions may also recover punitive damages. See, e.g., Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186-90, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359-61 (1978); Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp,, 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
27. Courts have required that consideration other than the employee's services
4
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Several traditional tort causes of action may be available to the dis-
charged employee at will. First, an employer's conduct may be found to have
been so "extreme and outrageous" that a court would allow a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 28 While the discharge
itself, if permissible under state law, will not satisfy the outrageous conduct
requirement, 29 such conduct may be found in the employer's related acts.30
Second, some courts have recognized the potential financial gains from em-
ployment as an interest protected by the tort of wrongful interference with
prospective advantage.3 Finally, at least one court has expressed its willing-
ness to apply prima facie tort doctrine in the employment context upon a
be given to render enforceable the employer's promise not to discharge without cause.
See, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 623, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896-97 (1980). The "mutuality of obligation" doctrine
may bar plaintiff's recovery. See, e.g., Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174
La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932) ("[I]f the contract of employment be not binding
on the employee... then it cannot be binding on the employer; there would be lack
of 'mutuality."'). Further, the employment relationship may be regarded as a series
of unilateral contracts in which the employee accepts the employer's offers by con-
tinuing to perform employment duties. The employer may then end the relationship
by declining to extend a subsequent offer. See 1 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 70, at 13-
17, 292-93 (1963). Finally, the statute of frauds may preclude enforcement of an oral
employment agreement. See, e.g., Morsinkhoff v. De Luxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Co., 344 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
28. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1963), defines the cause of
action: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." See,
e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (adopting
the Restatement definition, but finding no intentional infliction of emotional distress
on the facts).
29. See Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, -, 620 P.2d 699,
703 (1980); Krauskopf, supra note 24, at 223-24.
30. See, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 286 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980)(cause of action stated by employee submitting to polygraph test and initiating labor
department investigation in order to receive final paycheck); Agis v. Howard Johnson
Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (employer discharging waitresses in al-
phabetical order in attempt to compel disclosure of stealing, constitutes outrageous
conduct). But see Williams v. School Dist., 447 S.W.2d 256, 266-67 (Mo. 1969)
(failure to show requisite outrageous conduct when school principal informs teacher
of contract non-renewal while teacher is under sedation in doctor's office).
31. See Eib v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 633 S.W.2d 432 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982). The Eib court set out the following elements as required to establish
the cause of action:
(1) existence of a valid business relation (not necessarily evidenced by
an enforceable contract) or expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or
expectancy on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional interference
inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expect-
ancy; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resultant damage to the party
whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.
Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
1987]
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finding of "intentional infliction of harm without an excuse or justification
that is legally cognizable as such." 'a2 These traditional tort actions have not
received wide judicial acceptance in at-will discharge cases.
Numerous jurisdictions, however, have recently begun to recognize a
cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge.33 This limitation on the em-
ployer's right to discharge an employee at will prohibits retaliatory and abu-
sive discharge.3 4 The term "public policy exception" is applied when the
cause of action is based on the employer's contravention of some principle
of public policy.35 The Court of Appeals of the Western District of Missouri
recently considered the public policy exception to the at-will rule in Boyle v.
Vista Eyewear, Inc.36
Judy A. Boyle worked as a laboratory helper at Vista Eyewear, Inc., a
manufacturer of optical products, from September 1977, to January 9, 1979.1
Her duties included the hardening and testing of eyeglass lenses. Regulations
of the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) require that all
eyeglass lenses be tested for their resistance to shattering before being sold
or distributed to the public. 8
Mrs. Boyle established at trial that standard industry procedure is to
harden all lenses by submitting them to a heat treatment or chemical treat-
ment process.3 9 Each lens is then tested for impact resistance by subjecting
it to a drop test in which a steel ball is dropped onto the center of the lens
from a height of 48 inches. 40
32. Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, __, 410 N.Y.S.2d
737, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.2d 160 (1979), appeal denied,
48 N.E.2d 603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979) (malice not shown where employer records
employee's telephone conversation and discharges employee after employee is arrested
on criminal charges). But see Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc) (Missouri employees may not contravene the employment-at-will doctrine "by
cloaking their claims in the misty shroud of prima facie tort").
33. See Employment-At-Will: A State By State Survey, 1983 Report of the
Employment-At- Will Subcommittee, Employment and Labor Relations Law Com-
mittee, Litigation Section, A.B.A. (D. Cathcart & M. Dichter, ed. 1983) (Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin have adopted or
have indicated a willingness to adopt a public policy exception to the employment-
at-will rule); see also Sides v. Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (North
Carolina adopts the public policy exception), review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d
13 (1985); Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (Texas
adopts the public policy exception).
34. Krauskopf, supra note 24, at 232 n.307.
35. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
36. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
37. Id. at 861.
38. 21 C.F.R. § 801.410 (1986).
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Testimony of Mrs. Boyle and several other employees was then intro-
duced to show that the drop test was never used at Vista and that the
hardening treatment was omitted on many lenses. 4' Mrs. Boyle was never-
theless ordered to initial forms indicating that she had treated and tested
each pair of lenses.4 2
During the course of her employment, Mrs. Boyle repeatedly complained
to her supervisor and to the president of Vista about the impropriety of such
a procedure. She was told to stop worrying and to continue performing her
duties as she had been instructed. Mrs. Boyle then threatened to report the
violations to the appropriate governmental authorities. After several months,
during which Vista continued its practice, Mrs. Boyle and four other em-
ployees complained to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). Upon learning that OSHA had no jurisdiction over the matter,
they filed a complaint with the FDA. 43 When Vista's president learned of
this he asked the employees to withdraw their complaints and to tell the
FDA that they had lied. 44 Several weeks later, OSHA conducted an inves-
tigation. 45
Two months after the complaints were filed with the FDA, Mrs. Boyle's
supervisor informed her that she was being fired for reporting to the president
of the company that her supervisor had been using drugs.4 6 Testimony re-
garding the circumstances surrounding the firing suggested, however, that
the accusation may never have occurred and that the story may have been
fabricated as a pretext to fire Mrs. Boyle in retaliation for contacting the
FDA .47
Mrs. Boyle subsequently filed her petition, alleging in Count III that she
was wrongfully discharged from her employment for filing complaints with





45. Id. The results of the investigation were not discussed in the opinion. The
opinion also does not indicate whether the OSHA investigation was a result of Mrs.
Boyle's complaint.
46. Id. at 861-62.
47. Id. at 862. On direct examination, the president testified that the plaintiff
had told him that the plaintiff's supervisor had fired her for arguing with the su-
pervisor. On cross examination, the president admitted that plaintiff had instead told
him that she had been fired by her supervisor for allegedly informing the president
that the supervisor was using drugs. The president testified, nevertheless, that the
conversation with the plaintiff was the first time that the subject of drugs had been
mentioned to him. Despite that, he claimed that he chose not to consult the supervisor
regarding the false accusation on which the supervisor had supposedly based the
plaintiff's discharge.
48. Id. Count I asserted a claim for overtime compensation. Count II asserted
1987]
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Count III for failure to state a claim.49 Mrs. Boyle prevailed on Counts I and
II which were tried to a jury.50 Both parties appealed, Mrs. Boyle asserting
that the trial court had erred in dismissing Count III1 .
The Boyle opinion sets forth a broad definition of public policy which
at first blush would justify the expectation that a discharged employee will
be afforded considerable protection from unjust dismissal: " '[P]ublic policy'
is that principle of law which holds that no one can lawfully do that which
tends to be injurious to the public or against the public good." 52 While most
courts have set out similarly expansive definitions,53 the public policy excep-
tion has, with few exceptions, been narrowly interpreted in the jurisdictions
which have recognized it.14
The predominant narrow construction of the public policy exception has
been recognized as necessary to preserve the important interest of the em-
ployer in a free enterprise system in exercising his independent judgement in
making personnel decisions.55 The facts upon which a discharged employee
can reach a jury in a particular jurisdiction is determined by that jurisdiction's
requirements for establishing a prima facie cause of action. Observers have
noted that if a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment or directed verdict,
his chance of success at trial is very good,5 6 perhaps because of the jury's
tendency to identify with, and therefore believe, the employee. 7 Thus it is
necessary that courts carefully delineate the requirements for a prima facie
cause of action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception.
a claim for damages arising from the employer's failure to issue a service letter stating
the correct reason for her discharge pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1978).
This Note discusses the court's opinion only with respect to Count II of Mrs. Boyle's
complaint.
49. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 862.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 862-63.
52. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871. The court cited the following cases in support
of this definition: Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959) (en banc);
Dille v. St. Luke's Hosp., 355 Mo. 436, 446, 196 S.W.2d 615, 620 (1946).
53. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.
2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (defining a violation of public policy as that
which contravenes "good morals or any established interest of society"); Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981)
(defining public policy as that which "strike[s] at the heart of a citizen's social rights,
duties and responsibilities").
54. See Krauskopf, supra note 24, at 233 ("[A]l but a few courts are placing
distinct boundaries on the wrongful discharge tort. . . ."); Comment, Wrongful
Discharge, supra note 4, at 1932 ("[T]he public policy exception has limited only
slightly the harshness of the at-will rule.").
55. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 136-
145, 421 N.E.2d 876, 881-86 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
56. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1428; Heinsz, supra note 5, at 882.
57. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1428.
[Vol. 52
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The requirement that the plaintiff be able to identify a particular public
policy as expressed in a constitutional or statutory provision is said to provide
"a workable means to screen cases on motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action or for summary judgment. ' 58 Recognizing a cause of action
based on judicial declarations of public policy, it is argued, would result in
a flood of "vexatious" lawsuits59 and would render employers and employees
uncertain as to the status of their relationship. 60 It is also argued that such
an approach will create an uncertain legal climate which might deter em-
ployers from locating in the jurisdiction because of a perception that their
free exercise of judgment might be hampered. 61
The court of appeals' discussion of the public policy exception begins
with a declaration that "[t]he public policy exception is a narrow exception
to the at-will . . . " rule which provides a cause of action for wrongful
discharge to an employee dismissed "in violation of a clear mandate of public
policy." 62 While it is true that some language in the opinion could be con-
strued as indicating the court's intent to create only a narrow exception to
the rule, 63 the court's discussion suggests a much broader interpretation. The
sources of "public policy" noted by the court, the cases cited, and the court's
categorization of those cases indicate an apparent willingness on the court's
part to recognize a broad exception to the at-will rule. Such an approach
could have a detrimental effect on management's ability to efficiently regulate
the workforce 4
58. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 73, 417 A.2d 505, 513
(1980).
59. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1428.
60. See Comment, Employment At Will: When Must an Employer Have Good
Cause for Discharging an Employee?, 48 Mo. L. Rlv. 113, 136 (1983).
61. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
62. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871.
63. The public policy exception is generally described as "narrow" only when
limited in its application to the employee who has been asked to perform an illegal
act or who has exercised a statutory right. See, e.g., Krauskopf, supra note 24, at
249 ("The paramount consideration that is consistent in the cases following the narrow
majority rule is the existence of a statutorily required duty." (emphasis added)); Note,
Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At- Will Rule,
64 N.C.L. REv. 840, 847 (1986) ("The narrow view of the public policy exception...
requires that public policy be legislatively declared." (emphasis added)). The Boyle
court acknowledges the creation of a "narrow" exception to the employment-at-will
rule. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871. The court purports to base the exception only on
"well established and clearly mandated" public policy. Id. at 878.
64. Professor Blades has analyzed the potential difficulties in this area:
Ordinarily, where both sides present equally credible versions of the
facts, the plaintiff will have failed to carry his burden. However, there is
the danger that the average jury will identify with, and therefore believe,
the employee. This possibility could give rise to vexatious lawsuits by dis-
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Of primary importance in formulating a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule is determining which sources of policy will give rise
to the exception. The issue is whether the particular public policy contravened
by the firing is of sufficient importance to justify infringement of the em-
ployer's prerogative to discharge employees. The majority of courts which
have adopted the public policy exception 65 have looked to the source of the
particular policy being evaluated for an indication of its importance. For
instance, in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,66 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted the "vagueness of the concept of public policy .... "67 describing it
as "a broad concept embodying the community common sense and common
conscience." '6 Further, the court recognized that other states have applied
the public policy exception where "the discharge violates judicially conceived
and defined notions of public policy, but does not necessarily contravene
any explicit statutory provision." ' 69 Nevertheless, the court considered the
gruntled employees fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion. If the
potential for vexatious suits by discharged employees is too great, employers
will be inhibited in exercising their best judgment as to which employees
should or should not be retained .... Compromise of the employer's power
to make such judgment about professional, managerial or other high-ranking
employees ... is especially undesirable. The higher ranking the employee,
the more important to the success of the business is his effective perform-
ance. Compounding the potential for undue inhibition of the employer's
judgment at the higher echelons of employment is the greater difficulty of
articulating a basis for the discharge at that level. Compared to the wage
earner, whose routine duties can usually be measured against a mechanical
standard, the value of a salaried employee is more likely to be measured in
such intangible qualities as imagination, initiative, drive, and personality.
The employer's evaluation of the higher ranking employee is usually a highly
personalized, intuitive judgment, and, as such, is more difficult to translate
into concrete reasons which someone else - a juryman - can readily un-
derstand and appreciate. Indeed, even if it is conceded that the protection
from unwarranted discharges afforded the rank and file employees by labor
agreements is appropriate, it might still be argued that no intrusion of any
kind upon the employer's evaluation of higher echelon employees should be
tolerated.
Blades, supra note 4, at 1428-29.
65. A number of courts faced with the issue of whether to adopt the public
policy exception have declined to do so on the ground that such lawmaking is more
appropriately in the province of the legislature. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire
Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M.
789, 794, 635 P.2d 992, 997 (Ct. App. 1981).
66. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
67. Id. at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 571, 335 N.W.2d at 839 (citing Palmateer v. International Harvester,
85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981), a "whistleblowing" case, as an example of
the broadest view of the public policy exception). For a discussion of the "whistle-
blowing" cases, see infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
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interests of the employee, the employer and society,70 and concluded that the
cause of action for wrongful discharge should be limited to cases in which
the public policy contravened is evidenced by a constitutional or statutory
provision. 7'
Indeed, most courts which have adopted the public policy exception have
limited its application to circumstances in which the plaintiff can identify a
specific constitutionally or statutorily expressed public policy which is con-
travened by the firing.72 A minority of the courts have conferred a cause of
action based on judicially determined public policy concerns.7 3
It is not clear which sources of public policy will support the wrongful
discharge cause of action in Missouri. The Boyle court cited the following
as sources of "public policy": 74 "the state constitution, '7 5 "the letter and
purpose of a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision or scheme, ' 76
70. Id. at 574, 335 N.W.2d at 841. The court analyzed these interests under
its proposed construction of the public policy exception:
Employee job security interests are safeguarded against employer actions
that undermine fundamental policy preferences. Employers retain sufficient
flexibility to make needed personnel decisions in order to adapt to changing
economic conditions. Society also benefits from our holding in a number
of ways. A more stable job market is achieved. Well-established public
policies are advanced. Finally, the public is protected from frivolous lawsuits
since courts will be able to screen cases on motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim or for summary judgment if the discharged employee cannot
allege a clear expression of public policy.
Id.
71. Id. at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840.
72. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir.
1979) (discharge for refusal to submit to polygraph test where statute forbade em-
ployers from cequiring such); Tameney v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (discharge for refusal to engage in illegal
price-fixing scheme); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1970) (discharge for obtaining legal representation in wage negotiations); Glenn v.
Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961) (dis-
charge for engaging in union activity).
73. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981) (discharge for informing law enforcement agency of criminal vio-
lations by a fellow employee); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H.
915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981) (manager discharged for failure to require employee to
make night cash deposit); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978)
(discharge for reporting violations of state and federal law to employers).
74. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871.
75. Id. (citing in support, In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 500-02, 291 S.W.
120, 123 (1927), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927) (post-World War I bequest to
German Red Cross did not violate public policy since judicial decisions and federal
statute did not prohibit bequest to alien enemy and beneficiaries were not "enemy"
after armistice within meaning of U.S. and Missouri constitutional provisions pro-
hibiting giving of aid and comfort to enemy)).
76. Id. (citing in support, Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370,
19871
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"the judicial decisions of the state and national courts,"" "the constant
practice of the government officials, ' 78 and, "in certain instances . . . profes-
sional codes of ethics." ' 79 Unlike the Wisconsin court, the Missouri court did
not explicitly indicate which of these sources express so clear a mandate of
public policy that a firing in contravention of such policy will sustain a cause
of action. Arguably, the court intended that a firing in violation of any of
the above would state a cause of action and, indeed, examples were given
of cases in which the courts relied on both legislative and judge-made public
policy.80 On the other hand, the holding in the case is worded so as to suggest
that the cause of action requires a clear constitutional or statutory expression
of such public policy.8 This ambiguity is evident throughout the court's
analysis of the public policy exception.
The court divided the public policy exception cases into four categories.
The first includes firings resulting when an employee has "declined to obey
directions to commit a crime or to act contrary to public policy."'8 2 The court
discussed ten cases in this classification. In all but one, the plaintiff-employee
652 P.2d 625 (1982) (federal antitrust laws cited as source of public policy against
participating in antitrust violations); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31,
46, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981) (allegations of corporate misconduct too general and
vague to establish that such misconduct contravened public policy as stated in sta-
tutory provision); Nye v. Department of Livestock, 196 Mont. 222, 228, 639 P.2d
498, 502 (1982) (administrative rules provide source of public policy supporting wrong-
ful discharge action)).
77. Id. (citing in support, Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959)
(en banc) (statutes are "higher" evidence of public policy than judicial decisions and
where legislature declined to abrogate law, the court declined also); In re Rahn's
Estate, 316 Mo. at 500-02, 291 S.W. at 123 (post-World War I bequest to German
Red Cross did not violate public policy since judicial decisions and federal statute
did not prohibit bequest to alien enemy and beneficiaries were not "enemy" after
armistice within meaning of U.S. and Missouri constitutional provisions prohibiting
giving of aid and comfort to enemy); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202,
1205 (8th Cir. 1984) (discharging employee for refusing to engage in prostitution
supports wrongful discharge cause of action)).
78. Id. (citing in support, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290, 340 (1897) (declining to recognize a public policy exception to federal
restraint of trade or commerce legislation for reasonable or well intentioned con-
tracts)).
79. Id. (citing in support, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58,
72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980) (physician discharged for refusing to conduct research
on potentially harmful substance does not state cause of action where research was
conducted within FDA guidelines)). The Pierce court warns that not all professional
codes of ethics express a clear mandate of public policy: "For example, a code of
ethics designed to serve only the interests of a profession or an administrative reg-
ulation concerned with technical matters would not be sufficient [to support a public
policy exception cause of action]." Id.
80. See infra notes 82-113 and accompanying text.
81. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 878; see infra text accompanying note 119.
82. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 873.
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was fired for refusing to commit an act specifically prohibited either by
statute or by regulation promulgated pursuant to statute. 83 For instance, in
O'Sullivan v. Mallon,8 4 an x-ray technician was discharged for refusing to
perform catheterizations. Performing such catheterizations would have con-
stituted a violation of the state's Medical Practice Act.8, Noting the public's
"foremost interest" in medical treatment, the Superior Court of New Jersey
held "that an employee at will may not be terminated by an employer in
retaliation for an employee's refusal to perform an illegal act."8 6 The ra-
tionale for restricting an employer's prerogative to discharge an employee
under such circumstances is compelling. As one court stated, "[A]n employee
should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction or to
jeopardize his continued employment." 8 7
In one of the cited cases, however, an employee was fired in contra-
vention of a public policy not founded upon any legislative pronouncement.
In Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc.,88 the plaintiff was fired for refusing
to sign a statement prepared by his employer.8 9 The statement purported to
summarize the contents of a prior conversation between plaintiff and two
company investigators during which plaintiff was questioned regarding the
theft of company property.90 Although the plaintiff had been promised that
he would not be prosecuted for his possible complicity, he nevertheless re-
fused to sign the statement, maintaining that it did not accurately reflect the
contents of the earlier conversation. 91 After concluding that plaintiff's com-
plaint did not state a cause of action based on the breach of an implied
83. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusal to
engage in what the court interpreted as prostitution as defined in criminal statute);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980) (refusal to violate antitrust law and a consent decree); Petermann v.
International Blid. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (refusal
to commit perjury); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App.
489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusal to violate state law regarding pollution control
reporting); Sides v. Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, review denied,
314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985) (refusal to commit perjury); Kalman v. Grand
Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (1982) (refusal to violate a state board
of pharmacy regulation); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149
(1978) (refusal to violate state law regarding medical care); Delaney v. Taco Time
Int'l, Inc., 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984) (refusal to violate state defamation law);
Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (refusal to violate federal
water pollution laws).
84. 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978).
85. Id. at 417, 390 A.2d at 149.
86. Id. at 418, 390 A.2d at 150.
87. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385,
389 (1980).
88. 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).
89. Id. at 561, 479 A.2d at 783.
90. Id. at 560-61, 479 A.2d at 782-83.
91. Id. at 561, 479 A.2d at 783.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 92 the court acknowledged that at-
will employees are "entitled to judicial protection when the cause for dis-
missal is derived from some important violation of public policy." 93 Absent
from the opinion is any discussion of the source of the public policy in
question. Only in the trial court's instruction to the jury is there any indi-
cation of the specific public policy violated: "The state has an abiding interest
in seeing to it that men are truthful in their affairs." 94 The instruction went
on to state that efforts by the defendant to have the plaintiff sign a statement
defendants knew to be false or that defendants did not care whether was
true or false would be "contrary to public policy." ' 95 The case was remanded
for a new trial, 96 arguably indicating the Connecticut Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy in the absence of a clear legislative indication of such policy.97
The inclusion of Magnan in its examples of public policy exception cases
suggests the court of appeals' approval of the nonstatutory approach to
public policy. This is further supported by the language used by the court
to describe the above group of cases. The court refers to the cases as ones
in which the plaintiff has "declined to obey directions to commit a crime or
to act contrary to public policy." 98 The implication is that the court would
look to sources of public policy other than those expressed in the constitution
or statutes, thus broadening the scope of the exception to provide relief in
cases in which the public policy violated is not legislatively based. Most courts
which have dealt with the issue have applied the exception to this category
of cases only when the plaintiff refused to violate a statute.9
92. Id. at 571-72, 479 A.2d at 788-89.
93. Id. at 569, 479 A.2d at 787.
94. Id. at 575 n.24, 479 A.2d at 790 n.24.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 577-78, 479 A.2d at 791. The trial court was found to have erred
in submitting count one (breach of implied covenant of good faith) to the jury.
Nevertheless, because the verdict for the plaintiff on that count was irreconcilable
with the verdict against him on count two (retaliatory discharge in contravention of
public policy) a new trial was ordered on count two.
97. The Magnan court relied on Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), for the proposition that Connecticut had recognized
a public policy exception to the at-will rule. In its brief discussion of that case, the
court noted that it had approved the cause of action "where the discharge contravenes
a clear mandate of public policy." Magnan, 193 Conn. at 565, 479 A.2d at 785(quoting Sheets, 179 Conn. at 474, 427 A.2d at 385 (emphasis added)). Further, the
court cited to the Connecticut legislation providing the public policy which was con-
travened by Sheets' discharge. Magnan, 193 Conn. at 569, 479 A.2d at 787 (Sheets'
employer's food labeling practices were in violation of Connecticut's Uniform Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-222). To the extent that no clear
mandate of public policy was proposed in Magnan, it can be argued that the court
did not follow Sheets, but expanded the public policy exception as set forth in that
decision.
98. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 873 (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. 1985)
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A second category of public policy exception cases discussed by the court
includes the so called "whistleblowing" cases. Plaintiffs in these cases allege
to have been discharged in contravention of the public policy favoring em-
ployee reports of wrongdoing to employers or to law enforcement agencies.1 °
Courts have looked to the statutes which render the reported activity illegal
as the source of public policy on which to base the public policy contravened
by the firing. 101 To the extent that a particular legislature has imposed no
obligation on private citizens to report incidents of wrongdoing, however,
courts which recognize a whistleblowing cause of action under the public
policy exception are creating their own public policy. There is, of course,
considerable appeal in the argument that a criminal statute should serve as
an adequate indication of a such public policy, but to declare that particular
conduct is criminal is not the same as declaring the desirability of citizen
assistance in curtailing such conduct. Recognizing such a cause of action will
arguably serve to open the courtroom doors to any plaintiff that articulates
a similarly appealing parallel between some existing statute and a non-sta-
tutory principle of "public policy" contravened by the discharge.
02
Among the decisions discussed by the court in this category is the leading
case of Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.0 3 In Palmateer, the plaintiff
(refusal to violate Federal Water Pollution Control Act); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo
& Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 495-96, 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978) (refusal to
violate state law regarding pollution control reporting); see also Krauskopf, supra
note 24, at 235, 247-48 (most courts limit the wrongful discharge tort to discharges
violating statutory source of public policy). A case in which recovery was denied
when the discharge was alleged to have violated the public policy favoring truthfulness
is Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) (discharge for
refusal to sign a statement believed by employee to be false).
100. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 873-75. See generally Comment, Protecting the
Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle". A Cause of Action
Based on Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 777.
101. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 132-
33, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981) (relying on general criminal statutes for proposition
that public policy favors "citizen crime-fighters"); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978) (finding "substantial public policy" in state consumer
credit and protection act favoring an employee's seeking his institution's compliance).
102. For instance, suppose P is employed as the maintenance supervisor for
the ABC property management company. During the course of performing his duties,
P regularly installs high efficiency water heaters and furnaces as replacements for
worn out units, and provides wall and ceiling insulation in excess of housing code
requirements. ABC's owner discharges P upon learning of the unnecessary expenses
that have been incurred by ABC as a result of P's practices. P files suit for wrongful
discharge, alleging that the discharge contravenes the public policy favoring energy
conservation. As evidence of such public policy, P's complaint points out statutes
providing for an energy conservation tax credit on the federal income tax, appro-
priations by the general assembly to promote energy conservation programs, and
establishment of Federal Energy Guidelines for home loan eligibility. The issue arises
whether such statutes are sufficient indication of the public policy involved to justify
recognition of P's cause of action in light of the fact that the firing did not result
from P's failure to violate such statutes.
103. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
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was discharged for reporting criminal conduct by a fellow employee to law
enforcement officials and for agreeing to cooperate in the investigation and
prosecution.' 4 The court acknowledged the public policy exception to the at-
will rule and indicated that such public policy is to be found in the consti-
tution and statutes, and when absent therefrom, in its judicial decisions. 05
Noting the absence of a statutory provision requiring a citizen to participate
in crime prevention, the court determined nevertheless that public policy
favors "citizen crime-fighters" and recognized the employee's cause of action
for retaliatory discharge. 0 6
The dissent strongly criticized the majority's reliance on judge-made
public policy as a basis for the exception, warning courts to proceed cau-
tiously when making public policy determinations. The dissent emphasized
that no employer should be subject to suit merely because a discharged
employee's "conduct was praiseworthy or because the public may have de-
rived some benefit from it." o107 Commentators have expressed agreement:
Since most whistle-blowing cases involve management level employees where
the courts traditionally defer to the employer's decision-making latitude, the
dissent's objection is particularly sound. For the courts to make ad hoc
public policy decisions where there are differing value judgments that rea-
sonably could be made, would undermine the principle of deference to em-
ployer judgement.IaS
Courts have extended protection under the whistleblowing theory to em-
ployees discharged for seeking their employers' compliance with state phar-
macy regulations, 109 consumer credit and protection laws," 0 and state nursing
home regulations."' Along with Palmateer, these cases represent the minority
position. The majority, requiring that the discharge violates a specific sta-
tutory provision, has denied relief to employees discharged for reporting that
a corporate officer was taking kickbacks," 2 for revealing illegal foreign cur-
104. Id. at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877, 879.
105. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
106. Id. at 132-33, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
107. Id. at 139, 421 N.E.2d at 883 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
108. Krauskopf, supra note 24, at 239; see also Comment, Employer Rights,
supra note 11, at 226-27 (Palmateer court delved into "the nebulous area of judicially
created public policy" (quoting Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 136, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Ryan,
J., dissenting))).
109. See Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728
(1982).
110. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
111. See McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 69 Or. App. 107, 684
P.2d 21 (1984), review denied, 298 Or. 37, 688 P.2d 845 (1984).
112. See, e.g., Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979).
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rency transactions," 3 and for reporting violations of state security laws." 4
Thus, to the extent the Western District Court of Appeals recognized the
whistleblowing cases as falling within the public policy exception, its decision
is in accord with the minority.
Although two other categories of public policy exception cases were
briefly discussed in the Boyle decision,11 5 the court analyzed the case only in
terms of the first two categories, the whistleblowing cases and the cases in
which the employee is discharged for refusing to commit a crime or act
contrary to public policy."16
According to Court III of her petition, Mrs. Boyle was fired for warning
her employer that she would notify the FDA of the employer's illegal prac-
tices. 1 7 Further, according to the court: "She might have added, as the record
indicates and the jury apparently believed, she was also fired for refusing to
violate the FDA regulation, for persisting in hardening and testing lenses in
113. See, e.g., Edwards v. Citibank, 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup.
Ct. 1979).
114. See Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
115. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 875. The first of these categories includes "discharge
of an at-will employee whose acts are those that sound public policy would encourage,
for example, acceptance of a call to jury duty, seeking public office, asserting a right
to elect or designate collective bargaining representatives, or joining a labor union."
Id. The other category involves the "discharge of employees whose only sin was the
filing of a workers compensation claim." Id. The cases illustrate the broad category
of public policy exception cases in which the employee is discharged for exercising a
constitutional or statutory right applicable to the employment situation. See, e.g.,
Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1961) (discharge for engaging in union activity states a cause of action); Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharge for filing
worker's compensation claim states cause of action). Among these were two Missouri
cases which were discussed briefly but deemed inapplicable to the main case: Hansome
v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (wrongful
discharge cause of action stated when employee was discharged for exercising workers'
compensation rights under Mo. Rav. STAT. § 287.780, but exception to at-will doctrine
not relied on since statute gives employee cause of action against employer); Smith
v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963) (Article I, § 29 of
the Missouri Constitution creates a "modified at-will doctrine" conferring a wrongful
discharge cause of action on employee discharged for engaging in union activities,
but plaintiff was neither reinstated in his former position nor awarded punitive dam-
ages).
116. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 876-77.
117. The opinion states that "Count III alleg[ed] that she was wrongfully
discharged from her employment for filing complaints with OSHA and FDA." Id.
at 862 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, however, it is stated that she "was fired, ac-
cording to Count III, because she warned defendants that she would notify the FDA
of their illegal practices if they did not stop and because, despite her warnings,
defendants chose to continue to violate the positive duty laid upon them by the federal
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compliance with the regulation and for actually reporting defendant's vio-
lations to the FDA.""' The court then states that any of these allegations,
including those in Count III, would state a cause of action under the public
policy exception." 9 The implication is that the court is prepared to recognize
a cause of action when the plaintiff has been discharged for whistle-blowing
to company personnel or to law enforcement officers, or for refusing to
violate a statute. This is confirmed by the holding in the case:
Accordingly, where an employer has discharged an at-will employee because
that employee refused to violate the law or any well established and clear
mandate of public policy as expressed in the constitution, statutes and reg-
ulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or because the employee reported
to his superiors or to public authorities serious misconduct that constitutes
violations of the law and of such well established and clearly mandated
public policy, the employee has a cause of action in tort for damages for
wrongful discharge.-
With respect to discharge for refusal to violate the law, the decision follows
the sound logic employed by the majority of jurisdictions. Employers and
employees are on notice, by virtue of the constitution and statutes, of conduct
which is prohibited by law and therefore not to be required by the employer
of an employee. An employer who conducts his business within such clear
constraints is free to critically evaluate the workforce, hiring and firing as
required to maintain efficiency and productivity in the workplace. The dis-
gruntled employee will be unable to hail the employer before a hostile jury
unless that employee can point to a principle of public policy set out in a
specific statutory or constitutional provision which was contravened by the
employer.
The Missouri legislature has not imposed upon its citizens an obligation
to "blow the whistle." By announcing a public policy favoring such conduct,
the Western District Court of Appeals has expanded the public policy ex-
ception beyond the clear mandates enunciated in the state's constitution and
statutes. Creation of a cause of action in an employee discharged for blowing
the whistle should be left to the legislature.12' The same is true of actions
118. Id. at 877.
119. Id.
120, Id. at 878.
121. Michigan, for example, has enacted such a statute. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 15.361-.369 (West Supp. 1986), which provides in pertinent part:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate
against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, condi-
tions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a
person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report,
verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or
regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political
subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the
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involving discharges alleged to have been in violation of public policies not
explicitly articulated in the constitution or statutes. Recognition of a wrongful
discharge cause of action based on such judicially declared public policy
creates uncertainty as to the legal rights of employers and employees, 122 giving
employees an incentive to litigate and leaving the employer with no clear
indication as to whether an employee's conduct serves some judicially de-
termined public policy.
Because Mrs. Boyle was required by her employer to commit statutory
violations, and because she was fired, in part, for refusing to carry out such
violations, she would be protected under the public policy exception principle
condemning discharge for refusal to violate the law. Recognition of the
whistleblowing cause of action was thus unnecessary to the court's holding
in the case.
Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote on the role of public policy in judicial
decision making in 1930:
The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague
and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from
constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a
judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection. The
public policy of one generation may not be the public policy of another.11
Such advice is sound regarding the public policy exception to the employment-
at-will rule. Missouri courts should limit application of the new exception to
cases in which the employer has contravened a clear mandate of public policy
as expressed in the constitution or statutes. 2 4 As previously stated, this ap-
proach will benefit Missouri's employers and employees, largely through
employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested
by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held
by that public body, or a court action.
Id. at § 15.362 (West Supp. 1986); see also Westin, Michigan's Law to Protect
Whistleblowers, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1981, at 18, col. 3.
122. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
123. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930).
124. Missouri courts have decided only one public policy exception case since
Boyle. In Beasley v. Affiliated Hosp. Prods., 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),
the vice president-general manager of a hospital equipment manufacturer alleged that
he had been asked by his employer to predetermine the winner of an advertised raffle
of the company's equipment. The complaint stated that the employee was wrongfully
discharged for refusing to obey the instructions which would have resulted in vio-
lations of Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 570.140-.160 (unfair trade practices) and 18 U.S.C. §§
1343-1344 (mail and wire fraud). Id. at 560. The Eastern District Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal of the complaint, quoting from Boyle that employers "are not
free to require employees, on pain of losing their jobs, to commit unlawful acts or
acts in violation of a clear mandate of public policy expressed in the constitution,
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avoiding legal uncertainty in the workplace. 21 Such an approach will also
serve to further the state's general economic interests 26 and its interest in
judicial efficiency. 27
THOMAS G. LEMLEY
125. See supra notes 60, 64, 70 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 61, 70 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 59, 70 and accompanying text.
20
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